This paper investigates womens and mens labor supply to the firm within a structural approach based on a dynamic model of new monopsony. Using methods of survival analysis and a large linked employer-employee dataset for Germany, we find that labor supply elasticities are small (1.9-3.7) and that womens labor supply to the firm is less elastic than mens (which is the reverse of gender differences in labor supply usually found at the level of the market). Our results imply that about one third of the gender pay gap might be wage discrimination by profit-maximizing monopsonistic employers.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom tells us that women's market labor supply is more elastic than men's. This insight results from a vast number of empirical studies which investigate whether and how much labor individuals supply by using data from individual-or household-level surveys. Theoretical labor supply models also take the perspective of employees. This means that employers' perspective, i.e. the demand-side of labor, usually plays only a minor role.
From the perspective of a single firm, however, it does not matter whether an individual supplies labor generally, but whether he or she supplies it to this firm or not. Furthermore, not only unemployed but also employed workers are potential suppliers of labor to this firm. Therefore, firm-level labor supply differs substantially from market-level labor supply. Although women's labor supply is more elastic than men's at the market level, it might be less elastic than men's at the firm level, giving rise to steeper labor supply curves for women to the firm. Reasons for this could be different preferences over non-wage job characteristics and a higher degree of immobility. For instance, women's job moves might be less motivated by pecuniary considerations, but to a larger extent by the job's location (e.g., near nursery school) or the working hours offered (e.g., the possibility of working part-time).
Bearing this in mind, profit-maximizing firms may take advantage of genderspecific differences in supply elasticities by exercising wage discrimination, i.e. by paying different wages to women and men, ceteris paribus. This, in turn, could be one reason of the gender pay gap which is another stylized fact of labor markets. Theoretical considerations on this sort of wage discrimination originate from Robinson (1933) , who was the first to apply Pigou's (1932) concept of third-degree price discrimination at a commodity market to the labor market. Hence, Robinsonian discrimination differs fundamentally from Becker's (1971) concept of discrimination due to distaste because firms' actions when engaging in wage discrimination remain profit-maximizing as their considerations are not biased by costly prejudices.
Since Robinson's (1933) analysis assumes monopsony power in the classic sense of a single employer, one might doubt its relevance. The new monopsony literature, however, whose first systematic exposition and application to nearly all traditional topics of labor economics is given by Manning (2003) , emphasizes that monopsony power may even arise if there are many firms competing for workers. Models of new monopsony yield upward-sloping firm-level labor supply curves (even without concentration on the demand-side) due to search frictions, heterogenous preferences among workers, and mobility costs. To give but a few examples, Schlicht (1982) shows how gender differences in search frictions may translate into differences in firm-level labor supply elasticities, while Hirsch (2007) demonstrates that differences in genderspecific mobility patterns caused, e.g., by domestic responsibilities can generate less elastic female labor supply at the firm level.
1 Therefore, Robinsonian discrimination might be a widespread phenomenon in actual labor markets.
Whether firm-level labor supply differs between men and women, however, has been investigated in no more than three studies (according to our knowledge). Barth & Dale-Olsen (1999) find that firms' turnover rates are less elastic for women than for men, but they do not report elasticities. Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) find for a chain of grocery stores that female labor supply to the firm is less elastic than male labor supply with elasticities of 2.7 and 3.5, respectively. Both studies rely on Burdett & Mortensen's (1998) equilibrium search model with wage posting, where transitions to and from non-employment are totally wage-inelastic and workers change firms whenever they are offered wages above their current wage.
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Employing a framework similar in spirit to Burdett & Mortensen (1998) , Bowlus (1997) demonstrates that a significant part of the gender pay gap can be explained in terms of women facing higher search frictions in labor markets. Furthermore, Madden (1977) investigates Robinsonian wage discrimination for segmented local labor markets. The relationship between search frictions and occupational segregation is further investigated by Usui (2006 Usui ( , 2008 .
In contrast, we utilize a structural approach resting on methods of survival analysis proposed by Manning (2003) which avoids these restrictive assumptions by introducing wage-elastic transitions from and to non-employment as well as stochastic transitions among employers. Other than Manning (2003, pp. 206-208) , who did not find gender differences in firm-level labor supply elasticities when analyzing four datasets based on individual-or household-level surveys, we use a large German linked employer-employee dataset, the LIAB, to take the demand-side into consideration, too.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly develops a highly stylized version of Burdett & Mortensen's (1998) model similar to Manning's (2003) exposition. This is enriched in section 3, where our empirical specification is derived.
Section 4 describes the dataset used, while section 5 presents and discusses our empirical results. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
Theory
In this section we present the structural approach we are going to use when estimating men's and women's firm-level labor supply elasticities. The starting point is a simple model of dynamic monopsony, where we consider a profitmaximizing, non-discriminating monopsonist in discrete time. In the spirit of new monopsony theory, we regard the firm as a monopsonist in the sense that it faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve due to search frictions, heterogenous preferences of workers or mobility costs.
2 With this, we follow Manning (2003, p. 10) in arguing 'that labor economics should adopt a similar attitude to that in industrial organization and start analysis from the position that all employers have some labor market power'.
Workers are assumed to leave the firm in consideration in period t at a separation rate 0 < s(w t ) < 1 which depends negatively on the wage paid by the firm w t , i.e.
2
Surveys of monopsony in the labor market are provided by Boal & Ransom (1997) and Bhaskar et al. (2002) .
s < 0. Total separations in period t are therefore s(w t )L t−1 , where L t−1 denotes the firm's employment in period t − 1. On the other hand, the flow of recruits R(w t )
arriving at the firm depends positively on the wage paid, i.e. R > 0. Hence, the labor supply to the firm in period t depends on w t and L t−1 and is given by L t = L(w t , L t−1 ) = R(w t ) + [1 − s(w t )]L t−1 .
Given a steady state with L t ≡ L and w t ≡ w, firm's hires R(w) and separations s(w)L(w) must be balanced which gives a steady-state workforce of
with L > 0, so that steady-state employment depends positively on the firm's wage.
Taking logs and differentiation of (2) yields
where ε L Lw (w) ≡ L (w)w/L(w) denotes the long-run wage elasticity of firm's labor supply, ε Rw (w) ≡ R (w)w/R(w) the wage elasticity of the flow of recruits, and ε sw (w) ≡ s (w)w/s(w) the wage elasticity of the separation rate.
This simple dynamic monopsony framework can be developed further by making use of the Burdett & Mortensen (1998) model of equilibrium search theory with wage posting. In order to keep the analysis simple, we closely follow the presentation by Manning (2003) . Suppose there are continua of both homogenous workers and homogenous firms. Workers are either employed or non-employed, searching for jobs both on-the-job and off-the-job. They receive job offers at an exogenous job offer arrival rate λ e when employed and λ u when non-employed. Job offers are drawn at random from the wage distribution across employers F , where each employer pays a single wage to all his employees and sets this wage once-for-all to maximize his steady-state profits (which implies zero time preference of employers). Existing jobs break off at a job destruction rate δ which is assumed as exogenous. Let b denote workers' opportunity cost of employment, i.e. the utility flow per instant when non-employed. Workers' reservation wage w R depends on whether on-the-job or off-the-job search is more prospective. If neither on-the-job nor off-the-job search is more prospective, b also gives workers' reservation wage, otherwise we have w R ≶ b if and only if λ e ≷ λ u (cf. Burdett & Mortensen 1998) . Furthermore, we assume that workers' marginal and average revenue product of labor is constant at p per instant.
Employed workers accept job offers whenever they are offered wages above their current wage, while non-employed workers accept every offer.
3 In equilibrium, all firms must gain the same level of profits π which is given by π
where L(w|w R , F ) is the labor supply of a firm offering wage w given some wage distribution F and workers' reservation wage w R , which are explained endogenously.
Now consider the firm's separation rate s(w). As existing matches break off at rate δ and employed workers receive job offers at rate λ e , which they will accept if they pay more than their current wage, s(w) is given by
The number of recruits R(w) for a firm paying wage w is represented by
where u denotes the steady-state number of non-employed workers. (5) holds because non-employed workers receive acceptable job offers at rate λ u , whereas only employed workers earning less than w are willing to accept the firm's offer.
Differentiation of both (4) and (5) and some rearrangement yield
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This holds as w R is the lower bound of the wage distribution across employers F because all firms offering a wage w below w R would be unable to recruit any workers at all and would thus make zero profits.
because we are in a steady state, so that (3) applies. Therefore, absolute values of recruitment and separation rate elasticities are the same. Roughly speaking, this holds since one firm's wage-related separation is another firm's wage-related hiring and since hiring from non-employment as well as separations to non-employment are totally wage-inelastic. Making use of this result, we are able to estimate the longrun labor supply elasticity by simply estimating the separation rate elasticity. This can be done by using existing estimation procedures, such as hazard rate models (e.g., Campbell 1993), whereas we do not have such procedures for obtaining the recruitment elasticity.
This specification, however, is rather restrictive since it is assumed that workers change their jobs if and only if they are offered wages above their current wage and that transitions from and to non-employment are wage-inelastic. To overcome these restrictions, the first relaxation is to allow for stochastic transitions among employers. This is achieved by assuming that the worker's probability of job change depends positively on the ratio of the offered wage to the worker's current wage, so that workers are more likely to change jobs if offered a wage increase, but not for sure. Manning (2003, proposition 4.3) shows that the following holds
where w denotes the infimum of F 's support and w its supremum. (7) tells us that absolute values of recruit-weighted recruitment and separation rate elasticities are the same. In particular, this implies that for constant elasticities absolute values of both will be the same, so that (6) will hold again.
The second relaxation is to allow additionally for wage-related transitions to and from non-employment. There are several reasons why these transitions should be influenced by wages. For instance, individuals paid low wages are more likely to leave the labor market due to the availability of transfer payments or because they are more productive in household production. By doing so, individuals are simply better off. On the other hand, a high wage offer may cause non-employed individuals to take up a job. In short, the volume of voluntary transitions to and from non-employment is likely to depend on wages. The long-run wage elasticity of a firm's labor supply can thus be written as 
Taken together, these two results allow us to get estimates of both recruitment elasticities indirectly. Hence, we do not have to deal with the problem how to estimate recruitment elasticities directly.
To sum up, the results presented enable us to apply the following procedure for identifying the firm-level labor supply elasticity: In the first step, we have to estimate the separation rate elasticity to employment ε e sw , which also provides, in the second step, an estimate of the recruitment elasticity to employment ε e Rw . Third, we have to estimate the separation rate elasticity to non-employment ε u sw . Fourth, this estimate can be used to obtain an estimate of the recruitment elasticity from non-employment ε u Rw . Finally, these four estimates can be combined to obtain an estimate for the long-run elasticity of labor supply to the firm according to (8).
Empirical Specification
The results presented in section 2 can now be used to estimate the long-run elasticity of firm's labor supply. Suppose there are M workers (indexed m = 1, . . . , M )
with N employment spells (indexed i = 1, . . . , N ) who work for J firms (indexed j = 1, . . . , J). Let x i (t) = (x i1 (t), . . . , x ik (t)) denote a vector of k time-varying covariates observed for employment spell i at time t, where time corresponds to the time elapsed since the beginning of the spell. Next, let β = (β 1 , . . . , β k ) denote a vector of k coefficients which are the same for all spells i and constant over time.
) is a vector of l time-varying covariates observed for firm j(i) at time t, for which the worker with spell i is working, while γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ l ) denotes the corresponding vector of l coefficients. Finally, let υ j(i) denote a firm-specific time-invariant constant.
We model the instantaneous separation rate to employment of the i-th spell at time t conditional on x i (t), z j(i) (t), and υ e j(i) as
This gives a conditional hazard function with baseline hazard s e 0 (t) and unobserved firm-heterogeneity υ e j(i) , i.e. a mixed proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates.
4 (By analogy, unobserved worker-heterogeneity could be taken into account by including a multiplicative term υ e m(i) .) Next, we model the instantaneous separation rate to non-employment in the same manner as
In the following, let s ν 0 (t) ≡ 1 with ν = e, u, so that we get exponential models with time-varying covariates. 5 Moreover, we assume that υ ν j(i) follows a Gamma
4
For details about mixed proportional hazard models see Cameron & Trivedi (2005, ch. 17/18) and Van den Berg (2001) .
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It is important to note that exponential models such as ours or Manning's assume that there distribution with mean one and finite variance, i.e. E(υ ν j(i) ) = 1 and Var(υ ν j(i) ) < ∞, as put forward by Abbring & Van den Berg (2007) . Therefore, we get two exponential models with shared gamma frailties, which can be thought of as gamma-distributed random effects reflecting unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the firm.
Assuming that these instantaneous separation rates are independent, Manning (2003, p. 101) shows that they can be estimated separately: Two estimations are done, each of them considering two states, so that one has not to deal with competing risk models. The separation rate to non-employment is estimated using the whole sample, where transitions to non-employment and censored spells (i.e. job-to-job transitions and stayers) are distinguished. The separation rate to employment is estimated using the sample of those employment spells not ending with a transition from employment to non-employment. In this case, transitions to other firms and stayers are distinguished. While such a two-step procedure is also employed here, our approach of modeling the separation rates according to (10) and (11) is less restrictive than Manning's because the shared gamma frailties allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the firm.
If x i (t) includes spell i's log wage at time t ln w i (t), the wage elasticities of the conditional instantaneous separation rates are constant and are obtained from (10) and (11) by taking logs as
where ν = e, u and β ν w is the corresponding coefficient of log wage. Making use of is no duration dependence, that is, the baseline hazard is assumed to be constant over time, which puts a severe restriction on the model. There are both reasons for and against including a time-varying baseline hazard, which corresponds to the question whether or not to control for workers' tenure. One might argue that tenure influences the separation rate. As Manning (2003, p. 103) notes, one of the main theses of the new monopsony literature is that paying higher wages reduces separations and thus raises tenure, so that including a time-varying baseline hazard may take away variation from the wage variable. According to this argument, excluding tenure provides the wage estimate which we are actually interested in. On the other hand, the existence of seniority wage schedules, for example, may require to control for tenure. For this reason, as a check of robustness, we will also estimate mixed proportional hazard models with time-varying baseline hazards (piecewise-constant exponential models, where s ν 0 (t) with ν = e, u is a step function in time).
(12), the estimateβ Hence, the probability that a recruit comes from employment Pr(y i = 1) becomes
where notation follows the same rules as before. Note that y i is a binary response taking on the value one if a recruit comes from employment and zero otherwise. If x i includes the worker's log wage ln w i and β w denotes the corresponding coefficient, β w will be given by
Since the estimatedβ w is the same for all spells i = 1, . . . , N R , we may drop the index i and (14) becomes exactly the second term on the right-hand side of (9).
Therefore, we can obtainε u Rw fromε e Rw by subtractingβ w from the latter. To get an estimate for β w , we fit a logit model for the probability that a recruit is hired from employment since a logit model uses a standard logistic link function. Moreover, if we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity term υ j(i) follows a normal distribution with mean zero and some finite variance, i.e. E(υ j(i) ) = 0 and Var(υ j(i) ) < ∞, we will get a Gaussian random effects logit model.
In steady state, the share of recruits from employment and the share of separations to employment must be the same, so that we define θ ≡ θ R = θ s .
To obtain an estimate of ε L Lw making use of (8), we need to calculate θ. Then we are able to estimate the long-run elasticity of firm's labor supply aŝ
Manning (2003, pp. 100-105, 206-208) Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) , on the other hand, do find differences in elasticities between men and women, but they use the restrictive specification with deterministic transition behavior across firms and totally wage-inelastic transitions from and to non-employment, so that (6) applies. Using data from a chain of regional grocery stores from the U.S., they fit a probit model for the probability that a separation takes place. Again no firm-specific controls are added. Estimated supply elasticities, evaluated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables, are around 3.5 for male and around 2.7 for female workers (depending on specification), implying that firms have significant monopsony power. Moreover, the noticeable difference in elasticities could give employers the opportunity of engaging Robinsonian wage discrimination, which would mean that the more wage-elastic group, i.e. male workers, earns higher wages, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, using a Norwegian linked employer-employee dataset, Barth & Dale-Olsen (1999) present some evidence that female turnover is less wage-elastic, but they do not report elasticities.
Data
The dataset used in subsequent empirical analyses is the German LIAB, i. . Using the LIAB we are therefore able to control both for personal and establishment characteristics.
The employee history used for constructing the LIAB is based on the integrated notification procedure for the health, pension, and unemployment insurances. 6 This procedure requires all employers to report all information of their employees if covered by the social security system, where misreporting is legally sanctioned.
Notifications are compulsory at the beginning as well as at the end of employment.
Additionally, an annual report must be made for each employee employed on December 31 of the year. As a consequence, only those workers, salaried employees, and trainees who are covered by social security are included. Thus, among others, civil servants, self-employed, those in marginal employment, students enrolled in higher education, and family workers are not included. All in all, approximately 80% of all people employed in western Germany are part of the employee history.
The data include, among others things, information for every employee on daily gross wage, censored at the social security contribution ceiling, on the employee's occupation and occupational status, on industry, and on the start and end of each employee notification. Furthermore, individual characteristics, such as age, schooling, and training as well as nationality are contained. 7 Finally, an Details are given by and Bender et al. (2000) .
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Due to notifications made in the case of changes which are relevant according to benefit entitlement rules, there is also information on the person's marital status and the number of establishment number is included which is used to link the employee history and the IAB Establishment Panel.
The employer side of our dataset is given by the IAB Establishment Panel, a random sample of establishments (not companies) from the comprehensive Employment Statistics drawn according to the principle of optimal stratification. establishment data, we are able to control as well for person-specific characteristics as for characteristics of the establishment the employee is working for or is entering. Therefore, the labor market's demand-and supply-sides can be taken into consideration. We restrict our analysis to western Germany 10 and to full-time
A shortcoming of the LIAB is that daily gross wages are censored at the social security contribution ceiling, viz. e143.95 in 2000, e146.02 in 2001, and e147.95 in 2002. Obviously, using wage data without any correction would give biased estimates.
However, any imputation of the censored values cannot completely remedy this problem since it will introduce, by construction, some measurement error. This will cause inconsistent estimates of wages if they are used as an explanatory variable.
Therefore, we carry out our analysis only for those workers whose wages were always below the ceiling during the period of observation, which reduces the regression samples for men by 21.8% and for women by 8.0%. 12 This leaves us -after dropping establishments (and their employees) with missing values of the covariates in any of the years -with information on 402,105 employees working for 3,560 establishments.
The wages analyzed here are influenced by various actors and institutions in the German system of wage determination. In Germany, collective bargaining between unions and employers, which predominantly takes place at the sectoral and regional level but may also occur at the firm level, still plays a major role. In our period of observation, about 48% of establishments in western Germany were bound by collective agreements with unions (see Schnabel et al. 2006 ). This means they were not allowed to pay wages below the minimum set in the union contract, but they
10
We have excluded eastern Germany because the structural approach we make use of assumes steady-state conditions. These are more likely to be found in western Germany than in eastern Germany that still experiences the long transition from a socialist to a capitalist economy.
could pay higher wages, which many of them did. The 52% of establishments not bound by collective agreements were free to set wages of their own (although in some sectors such as construction government extension decrees stipulated that the union-set minimum wages were generally binding for the whole industry). Since large establishments are more likely to be engaged in collective bargaining, almost 93% of the employees in our sample are covered by collective agreements. The main sources of wage variation are thus sectoral (and to a lesser degree regional) differences in collectively agreed minimum wages as well as premia above this minimum that are individually paid by establishments.
The sample means of the wage and of the other explanatory variables are displayed in the appendix A.2). Just 26% of all employees in our sample are women (whereas the average share of women in employment subject to social security was around 43% in western Germany in 2000). The lower share of female employment in our sample is to a large extent due to the fact that we have excluded part-time workers. Gartner & Stephan (2004) report an unconditional gender pay gap for Germany between 20% and 27%. Our (unconditional) figure is lower because more observations of men than of women fall on the ceiling and are consequently dropped, thereby automatically reducing the endowment effect in the working sample between men and women. See Maier (2007) for an overview on empirical studies of the pay gap in Germany, which is one of the highest within the member states of the European Union. has changed to non-employment without receiving benefits from the unemployment office or that the person has become, for instance, a self-employed not included in the employee history. While our dataset does not enable us to disaggregate this category of unknown destination, information from other datasets suggests that the majority of employees in this category have moved to non-employment. 15 For this reason and in order to be consistent with our theoretical model, in the subsequent analysis we have combined the transitions into unemployment and into 'unknown' to separations into non-employment. Similarly, hirings from unemployment and hirings from 'unknown' are combined to hirings from non-employment.
Results
Now we apply the structural estimation procedure developed in sections 2 and 3 to estimate the long-run wage elasticity of firm's female and male labor supplies. We fit exponential proportional hazard models for the instantaneous separation rates to employment and non-employment to obtain the corresponding separation rate elasticities (see, e.g., Van den Berg 2001 , Cameron & Trivedi 2005 .
We further estimate a logit model for the probability that a recruit is hired from employment, where the estimated coefficient for the log wage links the separation rate elasticity to employment and the recruitment elasticity from nonemployment. Separately for men aned women, we estimate four models: without establishment controls, with establishment controls, with establishment controls and person-specific frailties (random effects), and with establishment controls and establishment-specific frailties (random effects). First, we include only person-specific controls. The effect we are mainly interested in is the effect of the wage on the separation rate to employment, so log daily gross wage is included as an explanatory variable. Theory implies that this effect should be negative: The higher the wages paid, the lower should be the separation rate. Since we argue that monopsonistic wage discrimination could be part of the explanation of the gender pay gap, we expect women to be less wage-elastic.
There are several other variables which may influence the separation rate to employment, so that controlling for these factors is necessary to get a reliable estimate for the separation rate elasticity of men and women. For instance, the transition behavior of German and non-German workers may differ. Next, we expect workers' age to play an important role. If we think of labor markets characterized by important search frictions as in the theoretical model of section 2, one would conjecture that older workers are more likely to be found at better paying jobs. This simply reflects their longer search activity, giving rise to better jobs on average.
Therefore, we suspect workers to change jobs more often when they are young, while the extent of job changes reduces as workers get older. This is also in line with empirical observations as reported in the references given in footnote 16. To control for these age effects, we add a set of age dummies.
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A different story applies to workers' formal education. We distinguish six different groups: workers with neither apprenticeship nor Abitur (which is the while Winkelmann & Zimmermann (1998) and Korpi & Mertens (2003) investigate jobmobility.
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Note that only those employment spells are considered which do not end in non-employment, so that there are only spells ending with a transition to another establishment or spells being censored without such a transition. For example, the number of 270,282 male workers is obtained by adding up 157,902 stayers, 43,665 separations to employment, and 68,715 hirings (see figure 1 ).
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One might also argue that tenure could influence the separation rate. For a discussion of this point we refer to footnote 5.
German equivalent to A-levels or graduation from high school), those with only apprenticeship, those with only Abitur, those with both, workers with a technical college degree, and finally those with a university degree. We expect higher degrees of formal education to reflect higher productivity both in terms of signaling productivity and of higher investments in human capital. We conjecture that workers with higher formal qualification face less severe search frictions. Hence, their separation rate should be higher. By the same token, workers in occupations which need more skills should exhibit lower search frictions and should therefore have a higher separation rate to employment as well. 19 We distinguish eleven groups of occupations: basic and qualified manual occupations, engineers/technicians, basic and qualified service occupations, semi-professionals and professionals, basic and qualified business occupations, and, eventually, managers. Finally, we add year dummies to control for potential cyclical influences.
Estimation results for this model without establishment controls are reported for men and women in the second columns of tables 1 and 2, respectively. As expected, women are less wage-elastic than men, their elasticity being estimated only as −1.012 compared to −1.594 for men, where the difference between these estimates is statistically significant at the 1% level. All in all, controls have the expected signs.
Younger workers, workers with higher formal education, and those in occupations requiring more skills tend to have higher separation rates. Separation rates are significantly lower for non-German male workers and do not differ significantly for non-German female workers.
In a next step, we include establishment controls, estimates of which are reported in the third columns of tables 1 and 2. We now take into account that separation rates for workers of establishments belonging to different sectors may differ. Hence, we include ten sectoral dummies. 20 Since workers of different qualification as well
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Both conjectures are in line with empirical findings. Studies finding higher search frictions for less qualified workers and workers in occupations requiring less skills include, for instance, Van den Berg & Ridder (1998) , Manning (2003, pp. 44-49), and Postel-Vinay & Robin (2002) .
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Sectors are (1) agriculture, hunting, and forestry (including fishing), (2) mining, quarrying, electricity, gas, and water supply, (3) manufacturing, (4) trade and repair, (5) construction, (6) transport, storage, and communication, (7) financial intermediation, (8) business activities, (9) other activities and, finally, (10) non-profit organizations and public administration. as male and female workers differ in transition behavior, it is likely that working for establishments with different proportions of qualified and female workers in the workforce makes a difference, in particular if occupational segregation plays a role.
Therefore, we include the shares of qualified and female workers. Following the collective voice argument given by Freeman & Medoff (1984) , the representation of workers' interests either by a works council or by a union (via collective agreements at sectoral or firm level) may improve morale and thus reduce the separation rate to employment. Finally, we expect the separation rate to be lower in establishments with good economic performance and new production technology as these establishments may be more attractive employers.
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As (unreported) likelihood ratio tests reveal, the models with establishment controls fit the data significantly better. The establishment controls usually have the expected signs, although most of them are not significant. Industry affiliation, however, plays a highly significant role. Adding establishment characteristics to the models leaves both the estimated separation elasticities and the size of the (significant) difference between female and male workers nearly unchanged. With an elasticity of −1.027, women are still less wage-elastic than men whose elasticity is estimated as −1.516.
In a next step, person-specific frailties are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the worker, which yields the estimates presented in the fourth columns of tables 1 and 2. Though adding person-specific frailties increases the overall fit of the model significantly, the magnitudes and signs of nearly all covariates do not change much. What does change noticeably in magnitude, however, are the estimated separation rate elasticities which are now −1.270 for female and −1.865 for male workers.
One might expect that establishment size, i.e. the total number of employees, is another influential variable. However, models of monopsony, such as the Burdett & Mortensen (1998) model, imply that establishment size can (only) be extended by paying higher wages, so that establishment size variables should not matter. In order to check this hypothesis, we added establishment size and its square to the models. As expected, our results were robust to this change in specification.
While it would be desirable to include both person-and establishment-specific frailties in the estimations, there is no established procedure for this sort of estimation which would have to take account of the joint distribution of the random terms. The last specifications therefore includes establishment-specific frailties rather than person-specific frailties to control for establishment-level unobserved heterogeneity. This is particularly interesting because this specification allows us to control (at least to some extent) for occupational segregation, which is argued to be an important determinant of the gender pay gap. 22 Estimates are presented in the fifth columns of tables 1 and 2. While the impact of most covariates remains unaltered, the gender difference in separation rate elasticities is reduced markedly, though it is still significant at the 1% level. Estimated separation rate elasticities are still lower for women than for men, being estimated as −1.171 and −1.461, respectively. Furthermore, the considerable changes in models' log-likelihoods imply that unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the establishment plays a more important role than unobserved heterogeneity of the worker.
Transition to non-employment. After estimating the separation rate elasticity to employment, we now turn to the separation rate elasticity to non-employment.
Completely analogously, estimation is done by fitting exponential proportional hazard models for the instantaneous separation rate to non-employment separately for men and women. transitions of women to non-employment take place. Spells ending with a transition from an IAB Panel-establishment to another establishment are included as censored since no transition to non-employment takes place.
Again, we begin with including only person-specific controls. In analogy to transitions to employment, prime-age workers should find themselves in better
22
The role of occupational segregation in monopsonistic labour markets is discussed in detail by Usui (2006 Usui ( , 2008 .
matches and thus should have a lower separation rate to non-employment. In contrast, workers close to retirement may have an incentive to leave jobs due to generous early-retirement options and welfare payments for old unemployed. The quality and value of a match may also be higher for those workers who have more formal education and those in occupations which require more skills. In particular, employers are less likely to layoff these workers. However, some groups of workers also have outside options that increase the likelihood of moving into our category of nonemployment. For instance, workers with Abitur are entitled to attend university, and employees with technical college or university degrees, managers, and professionals are more likely to become self-employed.
As can be seen from the second columns of tables 3 and 4, estimated coefficients tend to have the expected signs and are for the most part significant. The estimated separation rate elasticities of men and women differ significantly at the 1% level, women's transitions to non-employment being less wage-elastic than men's with estimated elasticities of −2.107 and −2.982, respectively.
Including the same establishment controls as above gives the models presented in the third columns of tables 3 and 4. Since our data do not allow us to distinguish voluntary from involuntary separations, it is important to control for factors that influence establishments' layoff behavior. This alleviates the problem that the negative correlation between wages and the separation rate may not just be a supply-side response, but also demand-driven. A case in point is establishments' profitability: Establishments with bad economic performance should lay off workers more often, so that the separation rate should be higher. We also include ten sectoral dummies because establishments belonging to different sectors may differ in layoff behavior. The existence of a works council or of collective agreements may reduce the separation rate to non-employment as establishments find it more difficult to lay off employees. Taking account of segregation, we also include the proportions of female and qualified workers in the workforce because establishments with different shares of these groups may differ in layoff behavior as well. In our eyes, the effect of new production technology is unclear because on the one hand it may reflect capitallabor substitution, whereas on the other hand the higher training costs associated with new production technology make layoffs more costly.
Performing a likelihood ratio test (not reported here), we find that the models with establishment controls fit the data evidently better, while the impact of personspecific controls is not changed. Most establishment controls have the expected sign (though not all of them are statistically significant). For example, firms with bad economic performance have significantly higher separation rates to non-employment, and there are differences between sectors. The estimated separation rate elasticity to non-employment is still significantly higher for men than for women. The difference in elasticities, however, is reduced with elasticities estimated as −2.112 for women and −2.676 for men.
Adding person-specific frailties gives the fourth columns of tables 3 and 4. While there are only minor changes for most of the covariates' impacts, separation rate elasticities are estimated markedly higher, estimates being −2.980 for women and −3.702 for men. The relative gender difference in elasticities, however, does not change much. Besides, the models' fit to data is improved significantly, as the log likelihood indicates.
Again, adding establishment-specific frailties instead of person-specific frailties is particularly interesting in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the establishment. The resulting estimates reported in the fifth columns of tables 3 and 4 show that the gender-specific separation rate elasticities do not change much compared to the model with establishment controls and without frailties. Estimated elasticities are −2.256 for women and −2.724 for men, so that the elasticity of women's separation rate to non-employment remains markedly lower than men's.
Given that our sample is based on a balanced panel of establishments, it is ruled out that the transitions into non-employment are driven by plant closings.
Nevertheless, downsizing can still exist. In these establishments, the separations from workers are to a large extent due to a fall in labor demand, rather than being a supply side response. A negative wage coefficient for transitions to non-employment would appear if a low wage is a signal of low productivity and therefore of a high probability of mass layoffs. To inspect the robustness of our results, we have repeated the empirical analysis excluding those 259 plants with a workforce of at least ten employees that experienced an employment reduction by at least 25% between 2000 and 2002.
23 However, the obtained wage elasticities are hardly affected, so that we conclude that the estimated supply elasticities are not driven by downsizing effects.
Hiring from employment. Finally, we have to fit a logit model for the probability that a recruit comes from employment, where the estimated coefficient of log wage links the separation rate elasticity to employment and the recruitment elasticity from non-employment. The following estimations use data of 68,715 male and 24,545 female recruits of IAB Panel-establishments, where 36,064 of male and 14,219 of female recruits are hired from employment.
First, we include person-specific variables, which gives the second columns of tables 5 and 6. We expect the probability that a recruit comes from employment (and thus the share of recruits from employment) to rise with the wage offered.
That is to say that high-wage firms poach more effectively, which is what theory predicts. One implication of this is that the recruitment elasticity from employment is higher than that from non-employment (cf. Manning 2003, p. 104) . The relative share of a particular group that is hired from employment depends on the ratio of employed to non-employed within this group, which again depends on differences in search frictions between different groups. 24 Taking non-Germans as an example, search frictions for this group may higher due to language barriers not fully reflected in formal qualification and/or due to discrimination, giving rise to higher unemployment for these workers. Non-employment rates also vary according to age, qualification, and occupation (as do search frictions, see the references in footnote
23
Results are available upon request.
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In fact, Manning (2003, pp. 44-49) demonstrates that the share of recruits hired from nonemployment can serve as a simple measure of search frictions and the degree of competition among employers within a labor market.
19). Note that the group of non-employed also includes those in the educational system, so that the probability of being hired from employment should be lower for young workers and those with an academic degree.
The estimates of the models presented in tables 5 and 6 display that hiring from employment varies significantly according to nationality, age, and qualification. The estimated coefficients of log daily gross wage for female and male recruits are 1.277 and 1.475, respectively. This gender difference, however, is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Next, all the establishment controls used in the exponential models above are included. Ten sectoral dummies control for differences among sectors since we expect establishments of different sectors to resort differently to non-employed workers.
On account of asymmetric information on workers' productivity, firms are likely to prefer recruiting from employment (through poaching). We therefore expect that establishments with a high share of qualified workers and new production technology tend to recruit from employment. Moreover, poaching will be easier if (in addition to higher wages) working conditions are more attractive. This is usually reflected by establishments being covered by a collective agreement or having a works council.
This argument also holds for firms with good economic performance, but these firms may also have to rely on non-employed workers to urgently fill vacancies.
We also include the proportion of female workers in the workforce because the impact of gender is our main focus and in order to guarantee comparability between estimations.
The results reported in the third columns of tables 5 and 6 show that there are noticeable differences among sectors and that the existence of a works council has a significantly positive impact on the hiring probability, whereas this does not apply for coverage by a collective agreement. The estimated coefficient of log daily wage reduces slightly for women, whereas it is markedly increased for men. The difference between female and male workers is now statistically significant at the 5% level, estimated coefficients of log wage being 1.410 for women and 1.899 for men, respectively. Including person-specific random effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the workers results only in minor changes, as can be seen from the fourth columns of tables 5 and 6. In particular, the models' overall fit remains nearly unchanged.
Finally, the inclusion of establishment-specific random effects presented in the fifth columns of tables 5 and 6 leaves the impact and magnitude of most covariates unchanged. The coefficients of log wage, however, change to 1.554 for women and 2.174 for men, where the difference is now statistically significant at the 1% level.
Furthermore, the log likelihood indicates that the models' overall fit is significantly improved.
Obtaining estimates for labor supply elasticities. Combining the results from tables 1-6 we can now use equation (15) to obtain estimates for the longrun wage elasticity of firm's labor supply separately for female and male workers. Table 7 presents the results of the four specifications estimated. The share of recruits from employment is obtained by calculating the sample average. In a steady state, assumed here, the share of recruits from employment must be equal to the share of separations to employment, i.e. θ ≡ θ R = θ s .
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Table 7 makes clear that labor supply elasticities are rather low and that there are differences between male and female workers. Estimated elasticities for female workers range from 1.865 to 2.585, while those of men range from 2.489 to 3.655.
26

25
For female workers there are 14,928 separations to employment and 11,505 to non-employment, while there are 14,219 female recruits from employment and 10,326 from non-employment, so that θ s = 0.565 and θ R = 0.579. For male workers, however, shares do differ substantially. There are 43,665 separations to employment and 26,195 to non-employment compared to 36,064 recruits from employment and 32,651 recruits from non-employment. Therefore, θ s = 0.625 and θ R = 0.525. Nonetheless, the implied differences in labor supply elasticities are less than 0.1 in all specifications. For the following calculations we used θ R which gives lower labor supply elasticities compared to using θ s , so that the gender differential is slightly lower.
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Note that -following the suggestion of a referee -we also estimated the simple specification with wage-inelastic transitions to non-employment used by Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) , where labor supply elasticities are given by the double absolute value of the estimated separation rate elasticity to employment. Estimated labor supply elasticities for male workers are then 3.032 with establishment controls and 2.922 with establishment frailties (random effects), which are clearly larger than the numbers reported in table 7. On the other hand, the corresponding estimates for female workers' labor supply elasticity are 2.054 and 2.342, respectively, which are quite close to the estimates presented in table 7.
While there is consensus that female labor supply is more elastic than male labor supply in terms of market supply (see, e.g., Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004, p. 38) , we find that female labor supply to the firm is less elastic than the labor supply of men, confirming the conjecture by Boal & Ransom (1997) which was the starting point of this paper.
In a model of (dynamic) monopsony, the labor supply elasticity at the level of the firm is intimately related to the firm's wage-setting power, which in turn enables us to use the estimated labor supply elasticities for calculating the implied gender pay gaps. This stems from the well-known fact that the proportional gap between workers' wages and their marginal revenue product of labor under monopsony is
given by the inverse of their firm-level labor supply elasticity, i.e. 27 Assuming that men and women have the same marginal revenue product of labor, which is plausible since we have controlled for many of workers' characteristics, these gender pay gaps are calculated
and
from the perspective of men and women, respectively, where both expressions follow at once from (16).
As the inverse of elasticities presented in table 7 give the proportional gap of workers' marginal revenue product and wages, our estimates imply substantial,
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Since this follows from a simple static model of pure monopsony, it could be questioned whether this result also holds in a dynamic framework. It does hold if one considers the simple model of dynamic monopsony from the theory section, provided that firms maximize steady-state profits and discount future profits only at a negligible rate (cf., Boal & Ransom 1997 , Manning 2003 . In this case, ε ν Lw , ν = m, f , denotes the long-run labor supply elasticity of male and female workers to the firm, respectively, which we have estimated. though not implausibly high market power on the firms' side. Given these firmlevel labor supply elasticities, female workers would earn 38.7-53.6% more were they paid their marginal products, whereas the gap is only 27.4-40.2% for male workers.
For example, in the specification with establishment frailties (random effects) these numbers are 46.6% for female workers and 40.2% for male workers, so that men earn only 71.3% and women only 68.2% of their marginal revenue product.
These differences in firms' wage-setting power in turn imply gender pay gaps.
When controlling for both worker's and establishment's characteristics but not for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the workers or establishment, the estimates suggest that women earn 9.8% less than men or, put the other way round, that men earn 10.8% more than women. These numbers are not implausible: Note that the actual unexplained gender pay gap in our sample obtained from an OaxacaBlinder decomposition is estimated as 11.4% or 14.3%, respectively, depending on the reference group (see table A.2 in the appendix).
However, as soon as we control for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the firm by incorporating establishment-specific frailties (random effects), the implied gender pay gaps are substantially reduced in magnitude, although their size is still of economic relevance: Our estimates suggest that women earn 4.4% less than men or, put the other way round, that men earn 4.6% more than women. 28 These findings give rise to the following interpretation: About one third of the gender pay gap in our sample is explained by a model of new monopsony focussing on gender differences in firm-level labor supply elasticities. The remaining two thirds are due to other reasons not investigated here, such as discrimination due to distaste or occupational segregation.
As a robustness check we repeated the whole analysis relaxing the assumption of a timeconstant baseline hazard, i.e. by controlling for workers' tenure (see footnote 5). This was implemented by fitting piecewise-constant exponential models. The estimated labor supply elasticities are generally lower (ranging from 1.848 to 2.596 for male workers and from 1.330 to 1.541 for female workers), whereas the implied gender pay gaps are larger (ranging from 7 to 26.5% for men and from -6.5% to -20.9% for women). While both the wage-setting power of firms and the gender pay gaps implied by these numbers appear to be implausibly high, our main findings concerning gender-specific differences in firm-level labor supply still hold.
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The latter explanation would be consistent with the observation that the inclusion of establishment-specific frailties (random effects) controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated women's and men's labor supply to the firm. We estimated labor supply elasticities within a structural approach resting on a dynamic model of new monopsony based on the Burdett & Mortensen (1998) model. Unlike Burdett & Mortensen (1998) , we allowed for stochastic transitions between firms and wage-elastic transitions from and to non-employment, in such a way following Manning (2003) . Estimations were carried out by methods of survival analysis, and we made use of the German linked employer-employee dataset LIAB for the years [2000] [2001] [2002] . All in all, estimated elasticities range from 1.9 to 3.7, depending on specification, where women's elasticity is always lower than men's. Although we have not been able to test for the structural approach chosen, our results should enable us to draw some cautious conclusions concerning the relevance and implications of gender differences in labor supply to the firm.
One important general insight is that estimated labor supply elasticities are far from the conventional textbook case of being totally elastic. This implies that the new monopsony approach is not rejected by the data, for its main feature is upwardsloping labor supply to the firm. Since the estimated elasticities are rather small in size, new monopsony models would suggest that firms have substantial monopsony power.
Confirming a presumption by Boal & Ransom (1997) , we found that (in contrast to labor supply at the level of the market) labor supply to the firm is less elastic for women than for men. Since this means that women's labor supply curve to the firm is steeper than men's, our findings are consistent with those of Green et al. (1996) who report larger employer size-wage effects for women than for men. Furthermore, our results confirm and extend the two other attempts made to investigate women's and men's labor supply elasticities, namely the studies of Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) and Barth & Dale-Olsen (1999) , since our analysis is built on less restrictive assumptions and explicitly controls for firm characteristics.
the level of the firm reduce the estimated labor supply elasticities and the predicted gender pay gap markedly.
Since in a model of (dynamic) monopsony, the labor supply elasticity at the level of the firm is intimately related to the firm's wage-setting power, we were able to use the estimated labor supply elasticities for calculating the implied gender pay gaps.
Depending on specification, women earn 4.4-14.8% less than men, ceteris paribus.
In a model including person-and establishment-specific controls and establishmentspecific frailties (random effects) about one third of the observed gender pay gap can thus be explained in terms of different labor supply elasticities at the firm level.
These findings are consistent with the notion of wage discrimination put forward by Robinson (1933, p. 224) , who argued that '[j]ust as we have price discrimination for a monopolist, so we may have price discrimination for a monopsonist.'
Whereas Robinsonian discrimination provides a relatively simple explanation for the persisting empirical regularity of the gender pay gap, it is difficult to interpret this pay gap as a long-run equilibrium outcome using Becker's (1971) concept of discrimination due to distaste without assuming some sort of market power on the demand-side. Moreover, employers' actions remain profit-maximizing when engaging in Robinsonian discrimination, whereas they are biased by costly prejudices when engaging in discrimination due to distaste because their profits are reduced in this case even if employers have considerable monopsony power (see, e.g., Bowlus & Eckstein 2002 ).
An open question that could not be empirically investigated here is the reason for the less wage-elastic labor supply of women. Potential explanations are different preferences over non-wage job characteristics and a higher degree of immobility of women. Manning (2003, pp. 47-49, 199-208) 
